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The Commercial Exception to Foreign
Sovereign Immunity: To Be Immune or
Not to Be Immune? That Is the Question
A Look at the International Law
Commission's Draft Articles on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States
and Their Property
GARY JAY GREENER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of foreign sovereign immunity allows a State to es-
cape the jurisdiction of the courts of another State.I However, immu-
nity is usually only granted for those acts that are sovereign or
governmental in nature (jure imperii).2 In the United States, there is
no immunity for acts that are private or commercial (jure gestionis). 3
Applying the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, however, can
result in denying a party a forum in which to resolve a dispute against
a foreign sovereign. 4 Therefore, in today's global economy, parties to
commercial contracts must take note of the applicable foreign sover-
eign immunity laws.
Most of the world's industrialized countries have attempted to
codify the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity. These countries
include the United States, Canada, Australia, Pakistan, Singapore, the
United Kingdom, and South Africa.5 Nonetheless, a universal decla-
* LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center, 1992; J.D. Southwestern University
School of Law, 1991; B.A., Brigham Young University, 1988. Mr. Greener sits on the Board
of Directors of the non-profit-organization, Role Model America, and is associated with the
Los Angeles office of Gilbert, Kelly, Crowley & Jennett.
1. See GARY B. BORN AND DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES COURTS 335 (1990).
2. Id at 337-38.
3. Id See generally infra notes 8-34 and accompanying text.
4. See JOHN R. STEVENSON ET AL., UNITED STATES LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
2-3 (1983).
5. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Third Session,
Loy. LA. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
ration on the subject has not emerged, because despite similarities in
these countries' treatment of the doctrine of foreign sovereign immu-
nity there exist also important differences.
Due to this lack of uniformity among countries, the International
Law Commission of the United Nations ("ILC") sought to codify a
universal declaration on the subject. The product of their efforts is
the Draft Articles on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their
Property ("Draft Articles"). 6 The Articles have been debated and
formulated over the past 15 years, and are now ready to be finalized as
a Convention.
The most important aspect of the Draft Articles arises in the ex-
ception to immunity for commercial activities. This Article will ex-
amine the Draft Articles' exception for commercial activities in light
of the applicable United States law, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976 ("FSIA"). 7 This Article asserts that while a codified set
of laws on foreign sovereign immunity is desirable, the United States
should not accept the Draft Articles as presently formulated.
Part II of this Article examines the history of the doctrine of
foreign sovereign immunity in the United States. Part III analyzes
the FSIA, and Part IV explores its commercial activities exception.
As it is important to understand that many parties shape the work of
the ILC, Part V provides a brief introduction to the ILC. Part VI
consists of a general overview of the Draft Articles.
Parts VII and VIII set out the Draft Articles' commercial trans-
action exception to immunity and compares it to current United
States law. Part IX then proceeds to examine the critical difference
between the proposed Draft Articles and the FSIA, namely, the "pur-
pose" versus the "nature" of the activity distinction. Finally, Part X
focuses on whether a Convention on this subject should even be con-
cluded in light of the changes that this Article proposes.
This Article concludes that the United States should not become
a member to a Convention which adopts the Draft Articles as pres-
ently formulated. The United States must advocate several changes in
the Draft Articles before signing on to them. The changes which the
United States should request are discussed throughout this Article.
U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 84-85, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991) [hereinafter Re-
port of the International Law Commission].
6. See id.
7. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1988).
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II. THE HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES
The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity is well rooted in
United States jurisprudence, tracing back to an 1812 decision, The
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.8 In that case, the United States
Supreme Court held that a French naval vessel was immune from the
jurisdiction of the United States courts.9 Although no law existed
which described this immunity,10 Chief Justice Marshall reasoned
that a United States court possessed no jurisdiction over the case.
In molding a common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, the
court relied on the notions of "perfect equality and absolute indepen-
dence of sovereigns,""1 principles of public international law,' 2 and
suggestions from the executive branch that immunity would be appro-
priate.1 3 The Court stated that:
One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being
bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade the
dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights
within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a for-
eign territory only under an express license, or in the confidence
that the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign station,
though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and
will be extended to him.
This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns,
and this common interest compelling them to mutual intercourse,
and an interchange of good offices with each other, have given rise
to a class of cases in which every sovereign is understood to wave
[sic] the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial ju-
risdiction, which has been stated to be the attribute of every
nation.14
This doctrine of sovereign immunity was later followed in Berizzi
Brothers Co. v. The Steamship Pesaro.15 Although over a century
passed between the decisions in The Schooner Exchange and Berizzi
Brothers, this inactivity can be explained by the fact that government
8. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
9. Id. at 147.
10. Id. at 135.
11. Id. at 137.
12. Id. at 136-37.
13. The Schooner Exchange, I I U.S. at 132-35.
14. Id. at 137.
15. 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
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owned merchant fleets developed only at the beginning of the twenti-
eth century. 16 When the Court in Berizzi Brothers confronted the is-
sue of jurisdiction over merchant ships owned by sovereigns, the only
existing precedent was The Schooner Exchange.1 7
Initially, United States courts applied the "absolute theory" of
foreign sovereign immunity"1 which granted immunity to foreign sov-
ereigns for all of their acts. 19 Additionally, the United States State
Department's role in applying the doctrine became more prominent. 20
The State Department made findings based on foreign countries'
claims of immunity from the jurisdiction of the United States' courts.
If the State Department determined that a nation deserved immunity,
it would communicate this finding to the court. The courts, although
technically not bound by these suggestions, generally regarded the
State Department's decisions as binding and implemented them.2'
Gradually, a number of nations abandoned the doctrine of "abso-
lute immunity" and embraced the notion of "restrictive immunity." 22
Under the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity, no blan-
ket immunity exists for a foreign sovereign. Instead, there is immu-
nity for sovereign or public acts (juri imperil), but not for a foreign
sovereign's commercial or private activities (juri gestionis).23
In 1952, the United States State Department formally acknowl-
edged and embraced the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immu-
nity. The State Department's "Tate Letter" stated that its immunity
"suggestions" would rest on the restrictive theory of sovereign immu-
nity.24 However, the State Department's involvement in the determi-
nation of immunity proved problematic.
In evaluating immunity, the State Department, an executive of-
16. Clark C. Siewert, Note, Reciprocal Influence of British and United States Law: For-
eign Sovereign Immunity Law From The Schooner Exchange to the State Immunity Act of
1978, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 761, 774-75 (1980).
17. Id. at 775.
18. BORN AND WESTIN, supra note 1, at 337.
19. Id.
20. See generally THEODORE R. GUFFARI, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN IM-
MUNITY 111-62 (1970) (discussing the emerging role of the State Department in immunity
claims). See also Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 581 (1943) (noting that the accepted procedure
was to seek immunity from the State Department).
21. Id
22. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 451 cmt. a (1986). The Restatement adopts the restrictive theory of immunity,
which is now accepted by nearly all non-communist states. Id.
23. Id. See also The Tate Letter, reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952).
24. The Tate Letter, reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952).
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fice, was nevertheless performing a function of the judicial branch. As
the number of requests for immunity from foreign owned enterprises
increased, so did this involvement of the executive branch in the af-
fairs of the judicial branch. Furthermore, the State Department's
"suggestions" were more often based on political and diplomatic con-
cerns than on a legal and factual basis.
25
From this conflict emerged a call for statutory law on this sub-
ject. In 1976, the United States became the first country to formalize
its sovereign immunity law in a statute,26 through Congress' enact-
ment of the FSIA.27 The FSIA adopts the restrictive theory of for-
eign sovereign immunity,28 and more importantly, transfers the power
to determine the existence of immunity to the courts rather than the
State Department.
29
The FSIA represents a comprehensive legal scheme in which
Congress intended to provide the "sole and exclusive standards to be
used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity ... .,30 The statute
delineates the bases and the process for the exercise of subject matter
jurisdiction over foreign states and their entities.3 It also provides for
venue in the federal district courts,3 2 for the right of removal from
state to federal court, 33 and, under certain circumstances, for the exe-
cution of judgments against certain categories of foreign states' com-
25. See generally Michael H. Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State Department Sugges-
tions: Recognition of Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper? 48 CORNELL L.Q. 461 (1963). For
one particularly glaring example, see Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir.
1961), in which the State Department made a "suggestion" of immunity in exchange for the
release of a hijacked airplane.
26. L. Weatherly Lowe, Note, The International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property: The Commercial Contracts Exception,
27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 657, 659 (1989).
27. The legislative history of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act reveals that Congress
intended the Act to eliminate the practice of judicial deference to "suggestions of immunity"
from the State Department, and thus to leave such sovereign immunity decisions exclusively to
the courts. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., at 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6610.
28. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 27, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6605.
29. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 27, at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6610 for the proposition that the courts shall have the power to determine sovereign immunity
issues. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (stating that "Congress finds that the determination by
United States courts of the claims of foreign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such
courts would serve the interests of justice and would protect the rights of both foreign states
and litigants in United States courts").
30. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 27, at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6610.
31. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1608.
32. Id. § 1391(0.
33. Id. § 1441(d).
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III. UNDER THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT ONLY
CERTAIN ENTITIES ARE ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY
Section 1604 of the FSIA provides that a foreign state is entitled
to immunity from the jurisdiction of United States courts unless an
exception exists under sections 1605 through 1607. 35 In other words,
a blanket grant of immunity to foreign states exists unless an excep-
tion strips that immunity away.
Section 1603(a) of the FSIA defines "foreign state" to include a
"political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumental-
ity of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b). ''36 Subsection (b)
states that:
An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any entity
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and (2)
which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof,
or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned
by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and (3) which is
neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defined in section
1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third
country.
37
The following subsections of this Article discuss the definitions of
the terms "foreign state" and "agencies and instrumentalities of a for-
eign state" according to the FSIA.
A. The Definition of the Term "Foreign State"
The definition of "foreign state" is not controversial. 38 As long
as the United States' government recognizes a state as an independent
sovereign, it qualifies for immunity under the proper circumstances. 39
Using this analysis, courts have even extended immunity to nations
with whom the United States' relations were not strong, such as
Libya4° and the former Soviet Union. 41
Section 1603(a) of the FSIA also includes "political subdivi-
34. Id. § 1610.
35. Id. § 1604.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
37. Id. § 1603(b).
38. BORN AND WESTIN, supra note 1, at 340.
39. Id.
40. See Carey v. National Oil Co., 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding Libya a "foreign
state" according to 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)-(b)(2)).
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sions" under the definition of "foreign states."' 42 The FSIA's legisla-
tive history provides insight into the definition of "political
subdivisions," stating that "[t]he term 'political subdivisions' includes
all governmental units beneath the central government, including lo-
cal governments. ' 43 Under this definition, a country's states, cantons,
provinces, or regions qualify for immunity.
B. The Definition of "Agencies And Instrumentalities
of a Foreign State"
If the entity seeking immunity fails to satisfy the section 1603(a)
requirements, it may otherwise qualify under section 1603(b) if it rep-
resents an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state." Several
cases have held that a corporation that is incorporated in and wholly
owned by a foreign state, and does business in that foreign state can be
considered an "agency or instrumentality" of that foreign state.44 In
fact, as long as a foreign state simply maintains a majority of the en-
tity's ownership interest, immunity would be proper.45 This result
follows from the premise that majority ownership reflects a majority
of control over that "agency or instrumentality." Conversely, if a for-
eign state's ownership interest in the entity is less than fifty percent,
41. See Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding the U.S.S.R. entitled to
sovereign immunity under the FSIA).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
43. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 27, at 15, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6613.
44. See Alberti v. Empresa Nicaraguense de la Came, 705 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir. 1983)
(finding a Nicaraguan corporation, which the Nicaraguan government nationalized and oper-
ated through an agent, an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign sovereign under the FISA);
Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1378 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding the
national airline of the Dominican Republic, which was wholly owned by the government, a
"foreign state" for FSIA purposes); Herman v. El Al Israel Airline, 502 F. Supp. 277, 278
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (finding El Al Israel Airlines a foreign state under the FSIA as the state of
Israel owned more than ninety-nine percent of the outstanding shares of stock). It appears
that Congress intended that the definition of "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" be
read broadly to encompass a variety of forms, "including a state trading corporation, a mining
enterprise, a transport organization such as a shipping line or airline, a steel company, a cen-
tral bank, an export association, a governmental procurement agency, or a department or min-
istry which acts and is suable in its own name." H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 27, at 15-16,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(bX2). See also H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 27, at 15-16, re-
printed in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614. The House Report explains that "where ownership is
divided between a foreign state and private interests, the entity will be deemed to be an agency
or instrumentality of a foreign state only if a majority of the ownership interests (shares of
stock or otherwise) is owned by a foreign state .... " Id.
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then it will be denied immunity.46 This result originates in the notion
that if the foreign sovereign lacks majority ownership, then it lacks
control. Finally, no immunity exists for an entity which is incorpo-
rated in a state different from that which owns it.
47
Difficulties arise when the entity seeking immunity is not organ-
ized as a corporation with stock ownership. The FSIA uses terms
such as "shares" and "other ownership interest"4 which describe cor-
porate entities. For example, in cases involving socialist or commu-
nist governments, questions arise as to whether the government
actually "owned" the entity.49
IV. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT PROVIDES
EXCEPTIONS TO THE GRANT OF IMMUNITY FOR
FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS
Sections 1605 through 1607 of the FSIA delineate several excep-
tions to the blanket grant of immunity. As previously stated, these
exceptions originate in the "restrictive theory" of foreign sovereign
immunity, which grants immunity for "sovereign" and "public" acts
yet denies immunity for "private" and "commercial" acts.50 The
most notable exception to the presumptive grant of immunity is the
commercial activity exception. 51
Section 1605(a)(2) states:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts
of the United States or of the States in any case in which the action
is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States
by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state else-
where; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state else-
46. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2); H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 27, at 15, reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614.
47. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(3).
48. Id. § 1603(b)(2).
49. See Edlow Int'l Co. v. Nuklearna Elektrarna Krsko, 441 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1977).
In Edlow, the court found that the defendant, a "workers organization" founded under the
constitution and laws of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for the purpose of con-
structing and operating a nuclear power generating facility, was not an "agency or instrumen-
tality of a foreign state" for FSIA purposes. Id. at 832. In making its findings, the court
rejected the proposition that all property under a socialist system is subject to the ultimate
ownership and authority of the state. Id. at 831.
50. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
51. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
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where and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.52
In order to properly analyze section 1605(a)(2), a few issues must
be addressed. First, the governmental conduct that comprises "com-
mercial activity" must be defined. Second, precisely when an action is
"based upon a commercial activity" must be established. Finally, the
connection or "nexus" between a foreign state's "commercial activ-
ity" and the United States must be defined.53 This Article addresses
each issue in turn.
A. Types of Governmental Conduct that Comprise
Commercial Activity
The general principle behind the commercial activity exception
to immunity is that when a sovereign nation acts like a commercial
entity, it should not be entitled to claim immunity since a non-sover-
eign entity in the same situation would not be allowed to claim immu-
nity. Section 1603(d) of the FSIA defines "commercial activity" as
"either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular com-
mercial transaction or act."' 54 Moreover, section 1603(d) states that
"the commercial character of an activity shall be determined by refer-
ence to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction
or act, rather than by reference to its purpose. '55 The FSIA empha-
sizes the "nature" of the activity, while the ILC Draft Articles use a
"two-pronged approach" focusing on both the nature and the purpose
of a commercial contract or transaction. 56 This represents an impor-
tant difference between the FSIA and the Draft Articles, which will
be discussed in detail in another part of this Article. 57
The legislative history of the FSIA explains that "the fact that
goods or services to be procured through a contract are to be used for
a public purpose is irrelevant; it is the essentially commercial nature
of the activity or transaction that is critical.158 The legislative history
clearly defines the term "commercial activity." It states that commer-
cial activity can be a single contract or a regular course of business.59
52. Id.
53. BORN AND WESTIN, supra note 1, at 362.
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See infra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
58. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 27, at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6615.
59. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 27, at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6614-
15.
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For instance, the legislative history provides illustrations of entities
engaged in "commercial activity," such as a mineral extraction com-
pany, an airline, and a state trading corporation 0 Congress also ad-
dressed for-profit activities, stating that "if an activity is customarily
carried on for profit, its commercial nature could readily be as-
sumed." 61 Additionally, contracts of the same character as those a
private individual could make may constitute "commercial
activity."
62
Although the legislative history provides clear guidelines, Con-
gress intended the Judiciary to refine a definition of "commercial ac-
tivity" through a case by case analysis, stating, "[t]he courts would
have a great deal of latitude in determining what is a 'commercial
activity' for purposes of this bill. It has seemed unwise to attempt an
excessively precise definition of this term, even if that were practica-
ble."'63 Nevertheless, other portions of the legislative history provide
additional examples of "commercial activity." The legislative history
reads:
[A] contract by a foreign government to buy provisions or equip-
ment for its armed forces or to construct a government building
constitutes a commercial activity. The same would be true of a
contract to make repairs on an embassy building. Such contracts
should be considered to be commercial contracts, even if their ulti-
mate object is to further a public function .... Activities such as a
foreign government's sale of a service or a product, its leasing of
property, its borrowing money, its employment or engagement of
laborers, clerical staff or public relations or marketing agents, or its
investment in a security of an American corporation, would be
among those included within the definition.64
B. The Loss of Immunity When the Action is "Based Upon" a
Commercial Activity
The FSIA disallows immunity when actions are "based upon"
commercial activity having a relationship to the United States.65
However, the FSIA and its legislative history fail to clarify this re-
quirement. The cases apparently employ a "centrality test" or
60. Id.
61. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 27, at 16, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6615.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). See also supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
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"4causal connection test." This signifies that some significant relation-
ship must exist between the case's factual basis and the cause of
action.
66
For example, in Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 67 the court focused on
"the elements of the cause of action itself: Is the gravamen of the
complaint a sovereign activity by the defendant?" 68 The court held
that the disputed act was commercial, and thus, immunity could not
be conferred. 69 In Callejo, the defendant-sovereign, a Mexican bank,
breached an obligation under a certificate of deposit. The court deter-
mined this to be the action on which the plaintiff was suing.70 The
defendant argued that the cause of action was based on Mexico's pro-
mulgation of exchange control regulations, a purely sovereign act, but
the court disagreed. 71 Since the basis of the plaintiff's complaint was
not a sovereign act, but rather a commercial activity, there was no
immunity under the FSIA.
C. The Nexus Requirement
Even if the other elements of section 1605(a)(2) are fulfilled, the
sovereign may still enjoy immunity if there exists no connection or
"nexus" to the United States. The FSIA allows a plaintiff three op-
portunities to establish the "nexus." Section 1605(a)(2) disallows im-
munity if the plaintiff's action is based upon: (1) a commercial
activity carried on in the United States; (2) an act performed in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere; or (3) an act outside the United States in connection
with the foreign state is commercial activity which causes a direct ef-
fect in the United States.72
Section 1603(e) defines the first clause, "commercial activity car-
ried on in the United States by a foreign state," as "commercial activ-
ity carried on by such state and having substantial contact with the
United States."' 73 The legislative history of this clause states that the
definition includes: (1) cases based on commercial transactions per-
formed in whole or in part in the United States; (2) import and export
66. The "centrality test" and the "causal connection test" are the author's terms.
67. 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).
68. Id. at 1109.
69. Id. at 1107.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1109.
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
73. Id. § 1603(e).
1992]
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transactions that involve sales to or purchases from concerns in the
United States; (3) business torts occurring in the United States; (4) an
indebtedness incurred by a foreign state which executes or negotiates
a loan agreement in the United States; and (5) a foreign state receiving
financing from a private or public lending institution located in the
United States. 74
Further, the legislative history clarifies the scope of the second
clause of section 1605(a)(2). The second clause "looks to conduct of
the foreign state in the United States which relates either to a regular
course of commercial conduct elsewhere or to a particular commer-
cial transaction concluded or carried out in part elsewhere." '75 Spe-
cific examples from the legislative history include:
(1) a representation by an agent of the foreign sovereign in the
United States that leads to an action for restitution based on unjust
enrichment, (2) an act in the United States that violates United
States securities laws or regulations, and (3) the wrongful dis-
charge in the United States of an employee of the foreign sovereign
who has been employed in connection with a commercial activity
carried on in some third country. 76
The last clause of section 1605(a)(2) states that immunity will be
stripped away for acts occurring entirely outside of the United States
which produce "direct effects" within the United States. The problem
with this clause is apparent; as one court has stated, "[d]etermining
whether a commercial activity abroad has a direct effect in the United
States is an enterprise fraught with artifice." '77
When interpreting the "direct effects" clause, the legislative his-
tory directs attention to the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States, section 18.78 Section 18 governs the
extent to which United States law applies to conduct abroad. Among
other things, in order for United States law to apply, the conduct
must produce a "substantial" effect within the United States, and that
effect must be a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside
the United States.79 For example, consider the nonpayment of a note
74. H.R. REP. No.1487, supra note 27, at 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6615-16.
75. Id. at 19, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6617.
76. Id. at 19, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6617-18.
77. Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Texas Trading
& Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 312 (2d Cir. 1981)).
78. Id.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 18(b)(ii)-(iii) (1965). See also Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1111.
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owed to a United States company in the United States. Courts have
found that nonpayment causes a direct effect in the United States
under the FSIA. 80 Additionally, a demand for payment on a letter of
credit issued by a United States bank has been held to produce a di-
rect effect in the United States, as it causes a depletion of funds in that
bank. 8'
V. INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
In order to compare the FSIA to the International Law Commis-
sion's Draft Articles, one must understand the dynamics of the ILC
itself. The International Law Commission is the only permanent
body within the United Nations that develops and codifies interna-
tional law.8 2 The ILC has drafted many of the world's basic interna-
tional law documents. 83 Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the
ILC provides that the ILC "shall have for its object the promotion of
the progressive development of international law and its codifica-
tion."'8 4 The ILC's success is illustrated by the fact that States fre-
quently accept its codified conventions as evidence of existing law.
85
States often cite to the ILC's work as evidence of the law long before
the formal conventions come into force.
86
The ILC's members sit in an individual capacity and not as rep-
resentatives of their governments. 87 Although election to the ILC is
not restricted to nationals of the United Nations member states, there
has never been a member elected to the ILC from a non-member
country.8 8 The ILC membership, initially only fifteen members, pres-
80. See Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 312
(2d Cir. 1981) (holding that breach of letter of credit payable in the United States to an Ameri-
can corporation had a direct effect in the United States); Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Empresa
Minera del Centro del Peru, 595 F. Supp. 502, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding that direct effect
of repudiation of promissory note was clearly felt in the United States); Schmidt v. Polish
People's Republic, 579 F. Supp. 23, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding Poland's default on its Treas-
ury notes had a "direct effect in the United States"), aff'd, 742 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1984).
81. Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1351 (11 th Cir.
1982).
82. See generally B. Graefrath, The International Law Commission Tomorrow: Improving
Its Organization and Methods of Work, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 595 (1991).
83. Id. For example, the ILC was responsible for first drafting conventions on diplomatic
and consular relations, the law of treaties and the law of the sea. Id.
84. Statute of the International Law Commission art. 1, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS,
THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 127 (1988).
85. Graefrath, supra note 82, at 595.
86. Id.
87. WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, supra note 84, at 6.
88. Id. at 7.
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ently totals thirty four.89
The ILC possesses the authority to select its own topics for codi-
fication in addition to those referred by the United Nations General
Assembly ("General Assembly"). 90 However, the ILC must first con-
sider those topics that the General Assembly asks it to consider. 91
The ILC appoints a "Special Rapporteur" for each topic. 92 The
Special Rapporteur analyzes the topic and submits a report to the
ILC.93 The ILC then debates the topic, and approves a provisional
draft, usually in the form of articles of a draft convention with com-
mentary.94 This draft convention circulates to the General Assembly
and to individual governments for their written observations.95
The Special Rapporteur studies the written observations together
with comments from the debates of the General Assembly's Sixth
Committee, and then compiles a revised report.96 After considering
these comments and suggestions, the ILC approves a final draft,
which it submits to the General Assembly with recommendations re-
garding action. 97
The ILC may recommend four possible courses of action to the
General Assembly. First, it can recommend that no action be taken
because the report was published. 98 Second, the ILC can ask the
General Assembly to acknowledge or adopt the report by resolu-
tion.99 Third, the ILC can ask the General Assembly to recommend
the draft to member states with a view to concluding a convention. 1°°
Last, the ILC can recommend holding a conference in order to con-
clude a formal convention on the matter.101 Regarding the Draft Ar-
ticles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, the
ILC recommended in its 1991 report that the General Assembly con-
vene an international conference of plenipotentiaries to examine the
89. Id.
90. Id. at 11.
91. Id.
92. Robert W. Schaaf, The United Nations International Law Commission, 18 INT'L J.
LEGAL INFO. 122, 124 (1990).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 124.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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Draft Articles and to conclude a convention on the subject. 10 2
VI. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S DRAFT ARTICLES
ON JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND THEIR
PROPERTY
In 1977, the United Nations invited the ILC to consider the
question of jurisdictional immunities of States and their property. 0 3
The ILC began its work on the topic in the following year. 1' 4 That
same year, Mr. Sompong Sucharitkul of Thailand was appointed the
first Special Rapporteur for the project. 05
The ILC adopted an entire set of Draft Articles on jurisdictional
immunity in 1986.106 Five years later, the ILC developed a final set of
these Draft Articles, 0 7 and recommended the conclusion of these
Draft Articles in the form of a Convention. 0 8
The cornerstone of the Draft Articles, as they appear now, is the
statement of "State Immunity." Article 5 pronounces that "a State
enjoys immunity, in respect of itself and its property, from the juris-
diction of the courts of another State subject to the provisions of the
present articles."' 0 9 The Draft Articles establish the basic premise
that a State is a sovereign and, as such, should be immune from the
jurisdiction of another State's courts. The remainder of the Draft Ar-
ticles explain the circumstances under which this immunity exists."10
A. The Evolutionary History of the Draft Articles
The evolutionary history of the Draft Articles is very important
because it demonstrates that the parties held no unifying view on ju-
risdictional immunities."' Instead, the ILC members proposed nu-
merous changes to the Draft Articles." 2 There was much debate,
some political wrangling, and several attempts to appease the con-
102. Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 5, at 10.
103. See G.A. Res. 151, U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 214-15, U.N. Doc. A/
32/45 (1978).
104. Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 5, at 8.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 10.
108. Id.
109. Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 5, at 37.
110. See generally Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 5.
111. See WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, supra note 84, at 113-17.
112. Id.
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cerns of all involved. 1 3 As a result, the formulation of the Draft Arti-
cles was anything but a simple, coherent process.
At its thirty-second session in 1980, the ILC attempted to con-
sider the preliminary report of the Special Rapporteur, but it lacked
sufficient time to fully consider the proposed articles. 1 4 However, it
adopted one article defining the scope of the articles.'1 5 The current
formulation of the articles' scope exists today as Article 1.116 At its
next session, the ILC reviewed five more articles that were proposed
by the Special Rapporteur.1 7 Nonetheless, the ILC had yet to ad-
dress the most important issues, namely those dealing with the excep-
tions to immunity.' 8
At its thirty-fourth session in 1982, the ILC discussed the juris-
dictional immunities issue." 9 At this point, the topic was still in the
preliminary stages of development. 20 The ILC reformulated the pre-
viously adopted Article 1 and provisionally adopted four more arti-
cles.' 21 However, the ILC was not able to agree on two of the most
important articles of the set. 122
In particular, the ILC experienced difficulty in stating the princi-
ple of state immunity and the major exception to immunity, the trad-
ing or commercial activity exception.123 The biggest debate
concerning Article 12 was whether to follow the "nature" of the ac-
tivity test that was consistent with the FSIA or to adopt the "pur-
pose" of the transaction test which enjoyed the support of many ILC
members.124 Failing to resolve this issue, the ILC left it for its 1983
113. Id.
114. Stephen M. Schwebel, Current Developments: The Thirty-Second Session of the Inter-
national Law Commission, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 961, 967 (1980).
115. Id.
116. See Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 5, at 11.
117. George H. Aldrich, Current Developments. The Thirty-Third Session of the Interna-
tional Law Commission, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 992, 995 (1981).
118. Id.
119. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Current Developments: The Thirty-Fourth Session of the Inter-
national Law Commission, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 323, 328 (1983).
120. Id. It was noted that the slow rate of progress regarding the issue of jurisdictional
immunities was due to the "sensitivity of the topic and the inability of the members of the
commission to agree on points as fundamental as whether the draft articles should follow the
'absolute' or the 'restrictive' theory of state immunity." Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. It must be noted that the principle of state immunity was originally codified in
Article 6, now renumbered as Article 5. Likewise, the commercial activity exception was codi-
fied in Article 12, now Article 10.
124. McCaffrey, supra note 119, at 330.
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meeting. 25
At the 1983 session, the ILC provisionally adopted three more
articles.1 26 The Special Rapporteur proposed Article 13 (exception
for Contracts for Employment) and Article 14 (exception for Personal
Injuries and Damage to Property),' 27 but the ILC resolved to review
these articles in the future.1 28 In 1985, the Commission provisionally
adopted the final exceptions to immunity, Article 19 (State-Owned or
State-Operated Ships Engaged in Commercial Service) and Article 20
(Effect of an Arbitration Agreement). The ILC also began to discuss
the subjects of attachment and execution.' 29
A set of Draft Articles was adopted on the first reading in
1986.130 However, these Draft Articles did not represent a complete
set as the cornerstone, Article 6, had not been agreed upon. 31 As
originally agreed upon, Article 6 was to state the primary rule of im-
munity. However, two competing choices existed for the formulation
of Article 6. The first option dictated that Article 6 state the general
rule of immunity and the existence of the exceptions.132 Meanwhile,
the other option avoided a general statement of immunity and instead
provided that certain circumstances create immunity. 33 Ultimately,
the first option was chosen and adopted in what is now Article 5.134
In 1988, the ILC received comments from twenty-eight govern-
ments.135 The new Special Rapporteur, Mr. Motoo Ogiso, submitted
a report analyzing these comments. 36 However, due to a shortage of
time, the ILC postponed any in-depth discussion of jurisdictional im-
munity until 1989.137 At that time, the ILC decided to concentrate its
efforts in 1990 on the Draft Articles. 38 It was believed that the sec-
125. Id.
126. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Current Development" The Thirty-Fifth Session of the Interna-
tional Law Commission, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 457, 460 (1984).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 466-67.
129. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Current Developments:" The Thirty-Seventh Session of the In-
ternational Law Commission, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 185, 194-96 (1986).
130. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Current Developments: The Thirty-Eighth Session of the Inter-
national Law Commission, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 668 (1987).
131. Id. at 670.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 5, at 37.
135. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Current Developments: The Fortieth Session of the Interna-
tional Law Commission, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 153, 168 (1989).
136. Id. at 169.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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ond reading of the Draft Articles could be completed by then.'3 9
At the forty-second session of the ILC in 1990, the ILC under-
took the second reading of the Draft Articles.40 The Drafting Com-
mittee completed work on sixteen of the Articles, but the Commission
took no action, electing instead to await the completion of the entire
set of articles. 14 1 Twelve articles remained for consideration at the
1991 session,142 at which time the ILC intended to complete its work
and submit a report to the General Assembly. 143
In 1991, at its forty-third session, the Commission finally com-
pleted its second reading, or final adoption, of the Draft Articles on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property. 144 The funda-
mental approach of the articles as adopted did not change between the
two readings. 145 However, some significant changes were made in in-
dividual articles.146
Most notably, Article 10, the commercial transaction exception
to jurisdictional immunity, was amended.147 The narrower term
"commercial contract" was eliminated in favor of the broader term
"commercial transaction" while the accompanying definition in Arti-
cle 2(l)(c) was also broadened. 48 This change is important because
the more expansive definition exempts more activities from immunity.
However, a third paragraph was added to Article 10 which placed a
limitation on the rest of that article. 49
VII. ARTICLE 2(1)(c) OF THE DRAFT ARTICLES DEFINES THE
MEANING OF "COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS"
Article 2(l)(c) of the Draft Articles defines a "commercial trans-
action" as:
139. Id.
140. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Current Developments: The Forty-Second Session of the Inter-
national Law Commission, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 930, 942 (1990).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Current Developments: The Forty- Third Session of the Interna-
tional Law Commission, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 703 (1991).
145. Id. "The final adoption continues to recognize several cases in which a state cannot
invoke immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of another state." Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 704.
148. Id. at 703.
149. Id. at 704. See infra notes 179-187 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Article 10(3) limitation.
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(i) any commercial contract or transaction for the sale of goods or
supply of services; (ii) any contract for a loan or other transaction
of a financial nature, including any obligation of guarantee or of
indemnity in respect of any such loan or transaction; (iii) any other
contract or transaction of a commercial, industrial, trading or pro-
fessional nature, but not including a contract of employment of
persons. 150
The Draft Articles' definition of "commercial transaction" re-
sembles the language of the FSIA referring to "commercial activ-
ity." 51 FSIA defines a "commercial activity" as "either a regular
course of commercial conduct or a particular transaction or act."1 52
Thus, the definition of a "commercial activity" under the FSIA and
the Draft Articles is similar.
VIII. ARTICLE 10 OF THE DRAFT ARTICLES CALLS FOR AN
EXCEPTION TO IMMUNITY FOR "COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS"
Article 10 calls for the denial of immunity under circumstances
which involve a commercial transaction.1 53 Article 10 contains three
subsections, each of which will be addressed in turn.
A. Article 10(1)
Article 10(1) reads:
If a State engages in a commercial transaction with a foreign natu-
ral or juridical person and, by virtue of the applicable rules of pri-
vate international law, differences relating to the commercial
transaction fall within the jurisdiction of a court of another State,
the State cannot invoke immunity from that jurisdiction in a pro-
ceeding arising out of that commercial transaction.
1 54
This rule applies to commercial transactions between a State and
a foreign natural or juridical person when another State's court could
exercise its jurisdiction by virtue of private international laws.155 The
ILC intended that each State be considered "eminently sovereign in
matters of jurisdiction,"' 56 and that each State should decide the
150. Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 5, at 12-13.
151. See supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
152. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
153. Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 5, at 69.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 71.
156. Id.
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scope of its own jurisdiction. 157
When a State possesses the authority to assert jurisdiction under
its own rules of private international law, then another State engaging
in a commercial transaction with a person, natural or juridical, other
than its own national, cannot invoke immunity. This basic rule is no
different than that stated in the FSIA. Simply stated, if a foreign
State conducts a commercial transaction, no immunity exists.
B. Article 10(2)
Article 10(2) states several exceptions to the first subsection. It
provides that "paragraph 1 does not apply: (a) in the case of a com-
mercial transaction between States; or (b) if the parties to the com-
mercial transaction have expressly agreed otherwise."158  The
Commentary to Article 10(2) suggests that it was designed to provide
"the necessary safeguards and protection of the interests of all
States." 159 The Article 10(2) exception represents an attempt to ap-
pease the diverse interests of the affected States and to encourage de-
veloping nations to participate in the Convention. 6° For example,
the Commentary notes that:
it is a well known fact that developing countries often conclude
trading contracts with other States, . . . both in the developing
world and with the highly industrialized countries. Such State
contracts, concluded between States, are excluded . . . from the
operation of the rule stated in paragraph 1. Thus State immunity
continues to be the applicable rule in such cases.
161
Article 10 differs from the FSIA in this respect.
The commercial activity exception to immunity embodied in sec-
tion 1605 of the FSIA makes no distinction for commercial activity
between two governments.1 62 Rather, the FSIA focuses on whether
the activity, transaction, or contract at issue was commercial. 163
In Castro v. Saudi Arabia,164 the court considered an agreement
157. Id.
158. Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 5, at 69.
159. Id. at 72.
160. See id.
161. Id.
162. See David A. Brittenham, Note, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Commercial Activ-
ity: A Conflicts Approach, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1440, 1485-86 (1983).
163. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 27, at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6615 (emphasizing the "essentially commercial nature of an activity or transaction that is
critical").
164. 510 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Tex. 1980).
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between the United States and the defendant foreign government of
Saudi Arabia for the training of military personnel. The court held
that immunity existed on the grounds that the agreement fell outside
the scope of the commercial activity exception under Section 1605 of
the FSIA.165 The court relied on the for profit nature of the contract,
rather than the fact that there was an agreement between two govern-
ments.166 The analysis in Castro illustrates that the Draft Articles'
distinction for contracts between States is a distinction that the FSIA
does not recognize.
Additionally, in Rush-Presbyterian-St. Lukes Medical Center v.
The Hellenic Republic,'67 the court's inquiry focused on the nature of
the activity and not the status of the parties.1 68 The court stated that
when determining whether the commercial activity exception applies,
an important inquiry is whether a private person could have engaged
in similar conduct.' 69 "If a private person could have engaged in the
same type of activity, then the sovereign has presumptively engaged in
'commercial activity' within the meaning of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act."' 70
Under the Draft Articles, contracts between States retain their
immunity, despite their commercial character. 17' However, the FSIA
inquires whether the activity of the contract was commercial. 172 The
FSIA is not concerned with whether both parties are governments. 73
Consequently, if the United States signed the Draft Articles as pres-
ently configured, United States law would experience change for the
worse.
The United States should not surrender jurisdiction over suits
involving commercial contracts and agreements with foreign sover-
165. Id. at 312.
166. Id.
167. 877 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1989). In Rush, physicians and hospitals brought suit against
the Greek government seeking payment of medical bills for kidney transplants provided in the
United States to Greek nationals. The Greek government had contracted with the plaintiffs to
perform the kidney transplants, as kidney transplants are not widely performed in Greece.
The court held that the Greek government's execution of the contract to reimburse the plain-
tiffs for the transplants fit the "commercial activity" exception to the FSIA. Id. at 581.
168. Id. at 577 (emphasizing the nature rather than the purpose of the activity).
169. Id. at 578.
170. Id.
171. Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 5, at 69. Article 10(2) pro-
vides that the exception to immunity does not apply to commercial transactions between
States.
172. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) and supra notes 50-71, 150-157 and accompanying text.
173. Id.
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eigns. For example, assume the United States entered into a joint ven-
ture agreement with the government of Brazil, under which Brazil
would manufacture a product in the United States. If Brazil breached
the agreement, it would be immune from a lawsuit under the Draft
Articles, even though the activity forming the basis of the lawsuit was
commercial. Article 10(2) allows such State contracts, even commer-
cial ones,174 unlike the FSIA which would allow a suit against Brazil.
The United States should debate this portion of Article 10 and
urge its redrafting. Article 10(2) should be changed so that commer-
cial transactions between the United States government and foreign
sovereigns will not automatically receive immunity in the event of a
dispute. It must be acknowledged that if Article 10 is altered, some
developing countries may refuse to sign the Convention. However, if
the Article remains unchanged, the United States should refuse to
sign. Having the United States as a signatory lends credibility to the
Draft Articles and is much more important than persuading some of
the developing nations to become members.
For example, the United States did not sign the Convention on
the Law of the Sea, 175 and without its participation, it has been impos-
sible to implement a coherent system of laws in that area.1 76 In refer-
ence to this Convention, one commentator wrote, "[B]ecause of the
overwhelming economic and political power of the United States, the
key to universal participation in the Convention is American approval
.... "177 This is one example of a Convention that all but failed be-
cause of the United States' non-participation.1 7 8 Similarly, without
the United States as a signatory, any Convention on jurisdictional im-
munities will likely fail.
C. Article 10(3)
Article 10(3) of the Draft Articles states:
The immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by a State shall not be
affected with regard to a proceeding which relates to a commercial
174. Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 5, at 69, 72. See supra notes
158-163 and accompanying text.
175. See U.N. CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA at 190, U.N. Sales No. E. 83 V.5
(1983).
176. Louise de La Fayette, Common Heritage Common Burden? The United States Posi-
tion on the Development of a Regimefor Deep Sea-Bed Mining in the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 212 (1992) (book review).
177. Id.
178. It should be noted, however, that neither the United Kingdom nor Germany signed
the Convention and almost all industrialized states have not ratified it. Id.
[V/ol. 15:173
Commercial Exception to Sovereign Immunity
transaction engaged in by a State enterprise or other entity estab-
lished by the State which has an independent legal personality and
is capable of: (a) suing or being sued; and (b) acquiring, owning or
possessing and disposing of property, including property which the
State has authorized it to operate or manage.'
79
The Commentary to Article 10(3) states that this aspect of the
commercial transaction exception is specifically designed for those
States whose systems of government include State-owned enter-
prises.' 80 This aspect of the commercial transaction exception would
come into play when the defendant was a State-owned airline or State-
owned manufacturing corporation, for example. As long as the two
subsections are fulfilled, then Article 10(3) shields the State, but not
the State's enterprise with immunity.
The practical application of Article 10 is consistent with United
States law. The key to the denial of immunity is whether the transac-
tion at issue involves a commercial activity. It is irrelevant whether
the enterprise is State owned or not. As long as the entity is taking
part in "private acts," those which a private person could perform,
there would be no immunity. The defendant would be the State-
owned enterprise and not the sovereign State.
As the United States Supreme Court held in First National City
Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior De Cuba,""' "[G]overnment
instrumentalities established as juridical entities distinct and in-
dependent from their sovereign should normally be treated as
such."'8 2 The Court reasoned that freely ignoring the separate status
of governmental instrumentalities would result in uncertainty over
whether an instrumentality's assets would be diverted to satisfy a
claim against the sovereign. 8 3 Thus, third parties might hesitate
before extending credit to a government instrumentality without that
government's guarantee.1
8 4
The notion that duly created instrumentalities of a foreign state
are to be accorded a presumption of independent status also finds sup-
port in the FSIA legislative history. During debate, Congress clearly
expressed its intention that duly created instrumentalities of a foreign
179. Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 5, at 69.
180. Id. at 73-74.
181. 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
182. Id. at 626-27.
183. Id. at 626.
184. Id. (citing Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43
U. CHI. L. REv. 499, 516-17 (1976) (discussing private corporations)).
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State are to be accorded a presumption of independent status. 8 5
However, United States case law suggests that, at times, the actions of
the government-owned entity or instrumentality can be imputed to
the government itself.18 6 For example, immunity would not be proper
if there existed an agency relationship between the government and
the government-owned enterprise or instrumentality.187
D. Stripping Away Immunity Under The Principles Of Agency Law
Under general principles of agency law, a foreign sovereign may
be subject to United States jurisdiction if the actions of its State-
owned entity can be attributed to the government. 88 In the case of
United Euram Corp. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,8 9 the
court stated that there were facts suggesting that the government-
owned corporation at issue was "acting on behalf of" the government
in the transaction in question.' 90 These facts were found sufficient to
withstand a motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity
grounds.' 9 ' Therefore, if acts of the State-owned entity can be attrib-
uted to the State itself, then the commercial activities exception to
immunity would not apply, and the State would not enjoy immunity.
In conclusion, Article 10(3) posits that a State should be treated
as separate from entities that it has created; this is consistent with the
FSIA and the case law. 192 However, no provision exists in the Draft
Articles for any exception to this immunity. According to United
States law, the State will not enjoy immunity if there is an agency
relationship between itself and its State-created or State-owned
185. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 27, at 29-30, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6628-29.
The House Report states:
Section 1610(b) will not permit execution against the property of one agency or in-
strumentality to satisfy a judgment against another, unrelated agency or instrumen-
tality. There are compelling reasons for this. If U.S. law did not respect the separate
juridical identities of different agencies or instrumentalities it might encourage for-
eign jurisdictions to disregard the juridical divisions between different U.S. corpora-
tions or between a U.S. corporation and its independent subsidiary. However, a
court might find that property held by one agency is really the property of another
(citation omitted).
186. See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
187. Id.
188. See BORN AND WEs-nN, supra note 1, at 344-45 (discussing arbitration of liability
between foreign government agencies). See also Ronald D. Lee, Note, Jurisdiction Over For-
eign States for Acts of Their Instrumentalities. A Model Attributing Liability, 94 YALE L.J.
394, 407-08 (1984).
189. 461 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
190. Id. at 612.
191. Id.
192. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
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entities. 193
When the final debate on these articles occurs, the United States
should urge that the absolute language of this Article be altered to
permit some instances in which the State itself can be sued for its
entities' actions. This would be akin to the agency relationship theory
of stripping away immunity. If the actual language of the Article is
not changed, then the Commentary to Article 10 should mention the
agency law principles of the United States. A reference to agency law
would be helpful to the United States since the Commentary is used
to interpret the Draft Articles.
IX. THE NATURE OF THE "COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY" VERSUS
THE PURPOSE OF THE "COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION"
Section 1603(d) of the FSIA states that "the commercial charac-
ter of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the
course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by ref-
erence to its purpose." 194 However, Article 2(2) of the Draft Articles
states:
In determining whether a contract or transaction is a "commercial
transaction". . . reference should be made primarily to the nature
of the contract or transaction, but its purpose should also be taken
into account if, in the practice of the State which is a party to it,
that purpose is relevant to determining the non-commercial char-
acter of the contract or transaction (emphasis added).195
This is a potentially significant difference between the FSIA and the
Draft Articles.
According to the FSIA, the sole focus is on the nature of the
commercial activity.196 The Commentary to Draft Article 2(2), on
the other hand, states that two tests, the nature and the purpose of the
commercial transaction, apply. 197 First, reference should be made to
the nature of the contract or transaction. If that inquiry establishes
that it is non-commercial in nature, no further analysis is required
and immunity exists.
However, another provision exists that allows a defendant a "sec-
ond bite at the apple," so to speak. If, after examining the nature of
193. See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
194. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (emphasis added).
195. Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 5, at 12-13.
196. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
197. Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 5, at 29-30.
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the contract or transaction, it appears to be commercial, then the de-
fendant sovereign can contest this finding by reference to the purpose
of the contract or transaction. The sovereign must establish that, in
its practice, the purpose is relevant to determining the non-commer-
cial character of the contract or transaction. 198 The Commentary de-
scribes this as a "two-pronged approach" to determining the
commercial character of a contract or transaction. 99
The purpose of this approach was to allow developing countries
to protect themselves when they entered into contracts. 2° ° For exam-
ple, suppose the sovereign State of Kenya entered into a contract with
a United States company to purchase wheat, and Kenya breached the
contract by failing to pay. Under the FSIA, the United States corpo-
ration could sue Kenya under the commercial activity section of sec-
tion 1605. Since the character of the contract was commercial in
nature, there would be no immunity.
However, under the Draft Articles, Kenya could claim that, re-
gardless of the contract's nature, the purpose was a non-commercial,
governmental act, and Kenya's practice is to treat such contracts as
non-commercial, governmental acts. Kenya could argue that the con-
tract for wheat was formed in order to feed Kenya's people, which is a
sovereign act deserving immunity. This argument would succeed
under the Draft Articles, and therefore, Kenya would be immune
from a lawsuit. The Commentary to Article 2 supports an inquiry
into the purpose, explaining:
Defendant States should be given an opportunity to prove that, in
their practice, a given contract or transaction should be treated as
non-commercial because its purpose is clearly public and sup-
ported by raison d'Etat, such as the procurement of food supplies
to feed a population... provided that it is the practice of that state
to conclude such contracts for such public ends.20'
Many problems arise when the courts attempt to decide what is
the "practice" of a particular sovereign in regards to the purpose of a
contract or transaction. Under the less stringent test of the Draft Ar-
ticles, there exists an increased potential for abuse and subjective in-
terpretation. The defendant would ultimately ascertain the meaning
198. Id. at 30.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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of "practice," no doubt resulting in a finding of non-commerciality
and, thus, immunity.
Additionally, the "two-pronged approach" offers little protection
for plaintiffs. This would produce a "chilling" effect on the formation
of contracts between sellers and sovereign buyers. Very few sellers
will contract with sovereign buyers if there exists a high probability
that the sovereign buyer will be immune from a lawsuit should a dis-
pute arise over the performance of the contract. In the words of one
scholar, "[c]ontracts designed to further the economic development of
Third World countries are not going to be promoted by a treaty pro-
viding for their unenforceability."202
The test of the FSIA makes more sense. The FSIA test is less
subjective than the standard under the Draft Articles. As long as the
nature of the activity is commercial, there is no immunity. 2 3 When
determining the "nature" of the activity, the inquiry centers on
whether a private person could have engaged in similar conduct. If a
private person could have engaged in similar conduct, then the sover-
eign has presumptively engaged in commercial activity. 2°4 Thus, no
immunity arises from that activity.
The fact that goods or services are to be used for a public purpose
is irrelevant. For example, a country's military activities would nor-
mally be considered a sovereign act. Under the FSIA, however, mili-
tary commercial activity does not merit automatic immunity. For
example, authority exists for the proposition that a contract by a for-
eign government to buy equipment for its armed forces constitutes a
commercial activity to which sovereign immunity does not apply. 20 5
In a recent United States case, the court held that "the intent of the
purchasing sovereign to use the goods for military purposes does not
take the transaction outside of the 'commercial' exception to sover-
eign immunity. ' ' 2°6
202. CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, STATE IMMUNITY: SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 17
(1988).
203. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
204. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Lukes Medical Ctr. v. Hellenic Republic, 877 F.2d 574, 578
(7th Cir. 1989).
205. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 27, at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6615 (stating that a contract by a foreign government to buy provisions or equipment for its
armed forces constitutes a commercial activity); Behring Int'l v. Imperial Iranian Air Force,
475 F. Supp. 383, 390 (D.N.J. 1979) (finding the Iranian Air Force engaged in commercial
activity in contracting for freight forwarding services).
206. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 758 F.2d 341, 349 (8th Cir.
1985).
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While the aims of the "two-pronged" nature and purpose test of
Article 2 are noble, namely protecting developing nations,20 7 the
United States should not accept this approach. The United States
should urge that only the "nature" of the commercial activity be ex-
amined and not the purpose. The United States must debate in favor
of changing Article 2. Only if Article 2 is changed to resemble the
FSIA should the United States sign on to the Draft Articles. Without
the United States as a signatory, the Draft Articles will most likely
remain a powerless document.
X. SHOULD THERE EVEN BE A CONVENTION ON THE SUBJECT
OF JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND THEIR
PROPERTY?
While the language of the commercial transaction exception in
Article 10 must change, that does not mean that the Draft Articles
serve no worthwhile purpose. The Draft Articles represent an impor-
tant effort and should be codified in the form of a Convention.
There is a need for international uniformity in the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. While some countries have similar laws,20 8 other
countries have different laws or lack laws entirely. 2° 9 This lack of
uniformity creates a lack of certainty among commercial trading part-
ners. One international set of laws on foreign sovereign immunity
would provide nations engaging in commercial transactions with
greater certainty.
Additionally, the Draft Articles attempt to address a wide range
of topics. The Draft Articles deal with immunity for employment
contracts (Article 11), personal injuries and damage to property (Ar-
ticle 12), intellectual and industrial property (Article 14), and the ef-
fects of an arbitration agreement (Article 17). These subjects should
be examined in light of the concept of sovereign immunity, and the
Draft Articles accomplish that task.
Therefore, a Convention should be concluded on the topic of ju-
risdictional immunities of states and their property. Although the
Draft Articles are not perfect, they are not useless. While changes
207. In fact, the goals of Article 2, protecting developing nations, would be thwarted
under the "two-pronged" test. Developed countries will be hesitant to enter into commercial
transactions with developing countries if a possible "out" exists.
208. Sompong Sucharitkul, Book Review, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 415, 415-17 (1989).
209. Id.
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need to be made, the Draft Articles should be concluded in the form
of a Convention.
XI. CONCLUSION
While some nations' laws address sovereign immunity, there is a
lack of uniformity among these laws.210 A need exists for a uniform
set of laws on sovereign immunity. Since the International Law Com-
mission is a truly international group and considers the comments of
many nations, the ILC would be the best vehicle to draft such a set of
uniform laws.
This is exactly what the ILC has done in the form of the Draft
Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property.
While these Draft Articles are a good beginning, they should be modi-
fied. The United States should not become a signatory to any Con-
vention which contains the Draft Articles as presently formulated. In
particular, those Articles dealing with exceptions to immunity for
commercial transactions and activities must be amended.
Specifically, Article 10 and Article 2 should be revised. Article
10 states the commercial transaction exception to sovereign immu-
nity. Article 10(2) must be changed to provide no immunity for com-
mercial transactions between governments. The character of the
transaction, whether commercial or not, should control and not the
parties to the transaction.
Additionally, Article 10 must be altered to dictate a lack of im-
munity when there is an agency relationship between a government
and a government-owned enterprise that is a party to a commercial
transaction. If the Article itself does not contain this language, then
the Commentary to Article 10 should include this principle.
Most importantly, Article 2 must be changed so that both the
"nature" and the "purpose" tests are not used. The only test that
should be used is whether the "nature" of the transaction or activity
in question is commercial. If Article 2 as presently drafted became
part of a formal Convention, it would do more harm than good. The
"purpose" test contained in Article 2 must be deleted.
In conclusion, the United States should not become a party to
any Convention containing these Draft Articles as presently written.
Without the United States as a member, any Convention concluded
would lack credibility and strength. Therefore, the international com-
210. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
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munity should be willing to negotiate as to the contents of the Draft
Articles. A Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and
their Property could become a reality if a few changes are made to the
Draft Articles. Hopefully, the United States will argue for these
changes. Only then should the United States become a member to
such a Convention. At that point, the global community would pos-
sess a much needed uniform set of laws on foreign sovereign immu-
nity, which is in every country's best interest.
